

Cyber Indoctrination Victims in Indonesia and Uzbekistan: Victim Protection and Indoctrination in Practice



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ABSTRACT

Terrorism has become a global phenomenon, affecting not only those hurt or killed by acts of terrorism but also involving women as significant contributors to indoctrination worldwide, including in Indonesia and Uzbekistan. This research aims to explain the evolving roles of women in terrorism in Indonesia and Uzbekistan and how terrorists use cyber indoctrination to target women in these countries. The research was conducted in Indonesia and Uzbekistan using the classical-normative dogmatic juridical method with a library-based approach. Cyber indoctrination has proven highly effective in persuading women to join and take initiative in acts of terror. Women who become involved in terrorism due to exposure to pseudo-religious ideologies through cyber indoctrination have human rights and should be legally protected as victims of cyber indoctrination by terror groups. This article contributes to the recognition of women's rights as victims of cyber indoctrination and sheds light on the changing role of women in terrorism. It aims to raise awareness among society, governments, law enforcement agencies, and religious leaders about the strategies of pseudo-religious cyber indoctrination employed by terrorists. It encourages them to take preventive and repressive actions to combat terrorism and safeguard women from its allure.



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1. Introduction

Terrorism is a complex and global phenomenon,¹ and there is no single universally accepted definition.² Various theories attempt to explain the spread of

¹ Steven Livingstone, *The Terrorism Spectacle* (New York: Avalon Publishing, 2019) <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429315251>

terrorist movements.³ Terrorists find it easier to disseminate their ideas when there are socioeconomic disparities and limited access to education.⁴ Terrorism is a tactic of intimidation with a specific systematic focus on particular interests. Omeje defines terrorism as organized group violence that deliberately targets civilians.⁵ Terrorists have various motives, including seeking social status (glory), imposing ideologies, exploiting religion, culture, hegemony, and power, striving for global dominance, or imposing a particular philosophical concept of terrorism.⁶ Terrorism creates an atmosphere of terror or fear in society by killing, looting, and imprisoning people. It also destroys vital installations, such as public facilities.⁷ It has caused destruction and induced terror in people.

In many countries, terrorism is identical to revolutionary activities from left-wing extreme revolutionary groups, such as the Red Brigade in Italy, the Red Army in Japan, or extreme right-winged groups.⁸ There are also religion-based groups such as Al-Qaeda. Terror incidents in Indonesia, such as the first Bali Bombing in 2005 and the series of bombings in the 2000s, were organized in the style of Al-Qaeda terrorism.⁹ All these terror attacks, including those in Indonesia and Uzbekistan, were carried out by men. Today, women may also be influenced by cyber indoctrination to become terrorists, enticed by ideas of heaven or heroism promoted through online interactions.¹⁰ In some terror actions, women have

² José Ángel Gascón, 'The Inferential Meaning of Controversial Terms: The Case of "Terrorism"', *Topoi*, 42.2 (2023), 547–59 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-022-09879-x>

³ J. Sinai, 'New Trends in Terrorism Studies: Strengths and Weakness', in *Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps, and Future Direction* (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 31–50 <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203969007>

⁴ Rajiv K. Goel, 'Do Weak Institutions Affect Recording of Terror Incidents? Evidence from the United States', *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*, 26.1 (2019) <https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2018-0054>

⁵ Huda Khoiril. (2017) Pradana, Trita Mulya Wira, 'Handling of Actors of Criminal Acts of Terrorism in the Protection of Human Rights Tirta', *Lex Scientia Law Review*, 1.1 (2017), 19–32 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.15294/lesrev.v1i01.19479>

⁶ Godfrey Garner and Maegin Alarid-Hughes, *Origins of Terrorism: The Rise of the World's Most Formidable Terrorist Groups* (London: Routledge, 2021) <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003170129>

⁷ Mohd Zaini Salleh and others, 'A Hybrid of Borda-Topsis for Risk Analysis of Islamic State Network Development in Southeast Asia', *Decision Science Letters*, 10.2 (2021), 185–94 <https://doi.org/10.5267/j.dsl.2020.11.001>

⁸ J. M. Lutz and B. J. Lutz, *Global Terrorism*, 4th edn (London: Routledge, 2019) <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351124683>

⁹ Ismail Koto and others, 'Provisions of Legal Protection for Terrorism Victim in Order to Realize Constitution Order', *Volkgeist: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum Dan Konstitusi*, 5.2 (2022), 243–52 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.24090/volkgeist.v5i2.6939>

¹⁰ Awaludin Marwan and Fiammetta Bonfigli, 'Detection of Digital Law Issues and Implication for Good Governance Policy in Indonesia', *Bestuur*, 10.1 (2022), 22–32 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.20961/bestuur.v10i1.59143>

become the primary perpetrators. Historically, these female terrorists were often the wives of male terrorists.¹¹

The victims of cyber indoctrination in Indonesia are often not well-known because it occurs on a massive scale online. Official data indicates that at least 1,067 men and 513 women have become victims of indoctrination in Indonesia.¹² In Uzbekistan, more than 1,526 men and 318 women joined the ranks of ISIS and migrated to Iraq and Syria. These victim counts only include those who emigrated to foreign countries. The Indonesian Government banned their repatriation and revoked their citizenship. In contrast, Uzbekistan's authorities have decided to accept women who emigrated to Iraq and Syria on the condition that they undergo social rehabilitation and deradicalization.¹³

Research conducted in Uzbekistan and Indonesia has shown that citizens from both countries have experienced extensive indoctrination, and thousands of citizens from both nations have emigrated to foreign states. However, the two countries have adopted vastly different policies. As per anti-terrorism legislation, Indonesia has banned the repatriation of all its citizens who emigrated to foreign countries and processes them under criminal law. On the other hand, Uzbekistan's authorities, under their Combating Terrorism initiative, have chosen to differentiate between individuals who require social rehabilitation and those who should be subject to criminal law. This separation is intended because some of them were deceived.

Research conducted by Johnston, Iqbal, and True has revealed that Indonesian women are being indoctrinated to participate in acts of terrorism. Terror groups intentionally target women, leading to hundreds of them relocating to areas controlled by these groups.¹⁴ This phenomenon is not limited to Indonesia; it also occurs in Uzbekistan, where Uzbek women migrate to Afghanistan, particularly to join the Islamic State terror group of the Khurasan Province (ISKP).¹⁵ In addition to

¹¹ R. Spaalj, 'The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 33.9 (2010), 854–70 <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.501426>

¹² Olusegun Fadare, Giacomo Zanello, and Chittur Srinivasan, 'The Joint Effects of Terrorism and Land Access on Livestock Production Decisions: Evidence from Northern Nigeria', *World Development Perspectives*, 27 (2022), 100447 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wdp.2022.100447>

¹³ Andrew Telford, 'Where to Draw the Line? Climate Change-Conflict-Migration-Terrorism Causal Relations and a Contested Politics of Implication', *Environmental Science & Policy*, 141 (2023), 138–45 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2023.01.001>

¹⁴ Alberto Posso, 'Terrorism, Banking, and Informal Savings: Evidence from Nigeria', *Journal of Banking & Finance*, 150 (2023), 106822 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.106822>

¹⁵ Seyed Ahmed Fatemi Nejad, 'Transferring to the East: The Path for ISIS Survival as a Terrorist Organization', *Central Eurasia Studies*, 13.1 (2019), 187–208 <https://doi.org/10.22059/jcep.2019.284004.449848>

Afghanistan, they also moved to Iraq and Syria, which serve as epicenters for the ISIS terror group.¹⁶

Research by Kurnia et al. reveals that Indonesia has chosen to impose penalties on women involved in terrorist activities. Thus far, all participants in deradicalization programs have been men, while women undergo deradicalization through educational curricula. The indoctrination process has influenced numerous women, many of whom later regret their involvement. They initially joined terror groups by relocating to their territories. However, when the terror groups were defeated, the Indonesian Government rejected their return and revoked their citizenship.¹⁷

Among those indoctrinated is Nada Fedullah, who is currently stranded in the Al Hol Refugee Camp in Syria. Fedullah and her sister left for Syria to join ISIS after reading online releases that portrayed the ISIS territory as a paradise. However, upon arrival, she realized it was a warzone and felt deceived and exhausted. Her attempts to return to Indonesia were met with rejection by the Government. She now hopes for forgiveness and reintegration. These details were shared in an interview with Sommerville and quoted by Chalmers in his research.¹⁸

A similar experience was also felt by Nurshandrina Khairadhania who now ended up in the Aynul Issa Refugee Camp in Raqqah province, Syria. ISIS had promised Khairadhania and her family that if they came to Syria, they would enjoy a good life, free education, guaranteed health treatments, and job opportunities, all under the banner of a "new Islamic society." She regrets believing in these promises and leaving for Syria.

Some other women's plans to move to Iraq were thwarted. Rosnazizi Khairoman Muksin and Safitri Arfan Umran were apprehended by authorities while attempting to board a plane to Turkey. These women, identified as Aidha by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, had joined ISIS in Nainawa (Mosul, Iraq) after following ISIS's website and media channels such as Furqon news. Their intended route was to cross the Turkey-Iraq border from Turkey to join ISIS illegally. According to available data, the Iraqi Government sentenced the two Indonesian women to fifteen years in prison for their involvement.¹⁹

¹⁶ M. Y. A. Kadir and S. Nurhaliza, 'State Responsibility of Afghanistan Under Taliban Regime', *Jurnal Media Hukum*, 30.1 (2023), 1–20 <https://doi.org/10.18196/jmh.v30i1.16020>

¹⁷ Setyo Widagdo, Kadek Wiwik Indrayanti, and Anak Agung Ayu Nanda Saraswati, 'Repatriation as a Human Rights Approach to State Options in Dealing with Returning ISIS Foreign Terrorist Fighters.', *SAGE Open Access*, 11.3 (2021) <https://doi.org/10.1177/21582440211032679>

¹⁸ Ian Chalmers, 'Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Bringing Back the Jihadists', *Asian Studies Review*, 41.3 (2017), 331–51 <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2017.1323848>

¹⁹ Rachmah Ida, Nisa Kurnia Ilahiati, and Muhammad Saud, 'Media Discourse on Islamic Women Jihadists in Indonesia: Islamic Radicalism Post-Arab Spring', *Feminist Media Studies*, 2018 <https://doi.org/10.1080/14680777.2023.2171083>

An Indonesian woman, Dwi Dahlia Susanti, has been sanctioned by the USA for her role as an ISIS financial facilitator since at least 2017. She assisted members of the militant group with money transfers involving individuals in Indonesia, Turkey, and Syria. Documents outline how Susanti joined ISIS after being exposed to indoctrination via Facebook. She then misused her stay permit to facilitate transfers to ISIS members in Turkey, utilizing her ID and permit of stay. Another woman, Dini Rahmadhani, was apprehended by Turkish authorities in Kayseri City. Rahmadhani, born on March 10, 1993, joined ISIS and became Susanti's right-hand accomplice. Her indoctrination into ISIS occurred via the Telegram application of the Baqiyah United Group (BUG).²⁰

As a global phenomenon, tens of thousands of women have been indoctrinated through cyber indoctrination and have chosen to migrate to terror group territories. Besides Indonesia, Uzbekistan has also grappled with this issue, with thousands of its citizens, including hundreds of women, falling prey to terror group indoctrination and relocating to areas under their control. However, after the terror groups were defeated, these individuals felt deceived and found themselves trapped in refugee camps without clear legal status.²¹ In such cases, some of them have become *manus manistra*—perpetrators who are, in reality, victims in need of protection.²²

This research is crucial because it highlights the massive extent of cyber indoctrination by terrorist groups in Indonesia and Uzbekistan. Thousands of people have migrated to foreign countries, many of whom have likely fallen victim to cyber indoctrination. In other words, they were deceived by these terrorist groups and became victims of cyber indoctrination. Not all of them willingly joined these groups; some were deceived, while others migrated with their families without knowing the true ideology or motivation. By the time they realized the truth, it was often too late, as they were already in a foreign country and had not engaged in terrorist activities. In such cases, human rights protection is essential. The Indonesian Government should verify their status and make efforts to protect their human rights, recognizing them as victims (*manus manistra*) rather than perpetrators. Those who actively engage in terrorist activities should still be subject to prosecution under anti-terrorism laws.²³

²⁰ Nick James and others, 'Geometric Persistence and Distributional Trends in Worldwide Terrorism', *Chaos, Solitons & Fractals*, 169 (2023), 113277 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2023.113277>

²¹ Ahmad Rajafi, Yassin Yetta, and Nur Allan Lasido, 'Deradicalism in the Family at Tahuna, Sangihe Islands, North Sulawesi', *Samarah*, 6.1 (2022), 369–90 <https://doi.org/10.22373/sjhk.v6i1.12445>

²² Jomon A Paul and Aniruddha Bagchi, 'Immigration, Terrorism, and the Economy', *Journal of Policy Modeling*, 45.3 (2023), 538–51 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2023.03.002>

²³ Basia Spalek and Salwa El-Awa, 'Governance and Counter-Terrorism: Engaging Moderate and Non-Violent Extremist Movements in Combatting Jihadist-Linked Terrorism', *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice*, 72 (2023), 100367 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlcrj.2019.100367>

This research addresses a gap in existing literature concerning the protection of women as cyber indoctrination victims (*manus manistra*) in Indonesia and Uzbekistan. The urgency of this research is underscored by the fact that many women were deceived by terror groups and migrated to foreign countries, only to find themselves banned from repatriation, with their citizenship revoked and their human rights stripped away. It is imperative to ensure the protection of their human rights. The primary legal issue investigated in this research revolves around determining how legal protections for women's human rights, specifically as *manus manistra* involved in cyber indoctrination, can be established.

2. Research Method

This research employs the classical normative dogmatic research method, which is a type of normative research method within the legal sciences framework.²⁴ It involves interpreting the meaning of dogmatic statements found in conversations²⁵ or media primarily to analyze and assess terrorist cyber indoctrination's impact on women. Additionally, it examines the role of public order regulations in government efforts to ensure public security. By describing and systematizing the relevant legal provisions, this research aims to propose legal reforms based on the current state of affairs.²⁶ To gather data, the authors engaged with Facebook and Telegram groups administered by terrorist perpetrators or indoctrination leaders. The goal was to collect samples that met the inclusion criteria, focusing on women involved in terrorism as either victims or perpetrators. However, the candidate respondents were often cautious and tended to provide one-sided indoctrination. They typically did not respond to inbox messages or comment on shared content. Moreover, they frequently used fake accounts that did not reflect their true identities.²⁷

The primary data were obtained by interacting with women involved in terrorism cases, particularly indoctrination perpetrators, by creating fake Facebook accounts. However, only a few administrators or randomly selected accounts, that shared content in the group were willing to respond to Facebook messages via inbox. The indoctrination system was largely one-sided, and many respondents also used fake accounts. The researchers employed concepts, laws, and principles

²⁴ S. Wibowo and others, 'Islamic Nomocracy: From the Perspectives of Indonesia, Spain and Russia', *Legality: Jurnal Ilmiah Hukum*, 31.1 (2023), 91–111 <https://doi.org/10.22219/ljih.v31i1.25358>

²⁵ J. Handayani, I. G. A. K. R., Karjoko, L., Jaelani, A. K., & Barkhuizen, 'The Politics Settlement of Land Tenure Conflicts During Jokowi's Presidency', *Journal of Indonesian Legal Studies*, 7.2 (2022), 487–524 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.15294/jils.v7i2.57539>

²⁶ M. Czuryk and J. Kostrubiec, 'The Legal Status of Local Self-Government in the Field of Public Security', *Studia Nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem*, 41.1 (2019), 33–47 <https://doi.org/10.19195/2300-7249.41.1.3>

²⁷ Reza Octavia Kusumaningtyas and others, 'Reduction of Digitalization Policy in Indonesian MSMEs and Implications for Sharia Economic Development', *Juris: Jurnal Ilmiah Syariah*, 21.2 (2022), 157–71 <https://doi.org/10.31958/juris.v21i2.6855>

from both Indonesian and foreign contexts.²⁸ The researchers also utilized interview results with several female terrorist perpetrators published in media or newspapers, employing the classical normative juridical method. These data were thoroughly analyzed.²⁹ In line with this research approach, the authors gathered data from existing laws, books, and journals supporting this study.³⁰

Data analysis revealed that all the respondents who acted as indoctrinators had used fake identities. The method of indoctrination they employed involved sharing posts that linked the oppression of the *ummah* (Islamic society) by non-believers with the concept of *jihad* as a means to combat such oppression.³¹ This form of indoctrination is referred to as pseudo-religious cyber indoctrination. In addition, the authors also analyzed existing laws.³²

3. Results and Discussion

Indoctrination of Women's Involvement in Terrorism in Indonesia and Uzbekistan

Most terrorist perpetrators are indeed men, which is the prevailing global trend. According to Spencer, their activities encompass various roles, such as cultivating a new generation of terrorists, managing administrative tasks, recruiting new members, acting as political representatives, and serving as operational commanders and militants.³³ These scenarios occur in both Indonesia and Uzbekistan. In the marital relationship among terrorist perpetrators, the husband typically holds the highest authority in the family. Consequently, he can undertake activities without the wife's knowledge or consent. The wife is expected to accept any of the husband's actions as right unquestionably and is discouraged from challenging him.³⁴ This type of family structure resembles an owner-property relationship. The husband, as the head of the household, is responsible for earning

²⁸ Daniar Supriyadi, 'The Regulation of Personal and Non-Personal Data in the Context of Big Data', *Journal of Human Rights, Culture and Legal System*, 3.1 (2023), 33–69 <https://doi.org/10.53955/jhcls.v3i1.71>

²⁹ A. Achmadi and others, 'Culture-Based Land Right Conflict Resolution Model A Case Study of the Dayak Tomun Indigenous People', *The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Cultural Studies*, 16.2 (2021), 1–10 <https://doi.org/10.18848/2327-008X/CGP/v16i02/1-10>

³⁰ Mohammad Jamin and others, 'The Impact of Indonesia's Mining Industry Regulation on the Protection of Indigenous Peoples', *Hasanuddin Law Review*, 9.1 (2023), 88–105 <https://doi.org/10.20956/halrev.v9i1.4033>

³¹ I. Shaffat, 'Konsep Jihad Dalam Konteks Kehidupanmodern: Pemikiran Sayyid Sabiq Dan Abu Bakar Jabir Al-Jazayri', *Ijtihad: Jurnal Wacana Hukum Islam Dan Kemanusiaan*, 11.1 (2011), 41–59 <https://doi.org/10.18326/ijtihad.v11i1.41-59>

³² Lego Karjoko and others, 'Indonesia's Sustainable Development Goals Resolving Waste Problem: Informal to Formal Policy', *International Journal of Sustainable Development and Planning*, 17.2 (2022), 649–58 <https://doi.org/10.18280/ijstdp.170230>

³³ A. N. Spencer, 'The Hidden Face of Terrorism: An Analysis of the Women in Islamic State', *Journal of Strategic Security*, 9.3 (2016), 67–78 <https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.3.1549>

³⁴ Spencer.

a living without the wife's input, while the wife's duties include providing meals, fulfilling sexual needs, giving birth, caring for children, and managing household responsibilities.³⁵

This owner-property relationship places women in a position of subordination to their husbands—for example, consider the case of Paridah from Lamongan, East Java, Indonesia. She used to enjoy engaging in discussions, particularly on religious matters. However, her behavior changed after she married Ali Ghufron, also known as Mukhlas, a man chosen by her father. Mukhlas rigorously indoctrinated his wife, and their children were raised according to Mukhlas' wishes to groom them as fighters. This represents an older indoctrination model, typically employed by husbands involved in terrorist organizations or those aligned with terrorist group ideologies.³⁶

A similar case occurred in Uzbekistan involving a couple, Sayfullo Saipov, and his wife, Nozima Odilova. Saipov, a native Uzbek, married a woman with Uzbek roots who held USA citizenship. He indoctrinated his wife with his terror ideology, leading to their involvement in terrorist activities.³⁷ This represents an older indoctrination method. A new paradigm of indoctrination has emerged, known as cyber indoctrination. This method represents a deeper and more widespread form of indoctrination on a global scale, leading to more significant roles for women in terrorism. Perpetrators have realized that women can support and assist in acts of terror by becoming "sleeping cells." Cyber indoctrination is highly effective, reaching a vast audience through internet access across a global network. Furthermore, it offers a level of direct security, making it challenging to detect indoctrination perpetrators.³⁸

According to Bloom, a new generation of terrorists has successfully recruited many marginalized women through cyber indoctrination. By glorifying women's lives during the era of the Prophet Muhammad, this terror group has deceived more recruits than its predecessors. Consequently, women have gradually attained positions of power in managing online terror groups. Due to these new methods, women now play roles in leadership, household affairs, and acts of violence. Across many countries, women have willingly joined terrorist

³⁵ M. Faisal Magrie and others, 'An Empowerment Program for Spouses of Convicted Terrorists in Indonesia', in *Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Indonesia* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2022), pp. 145–73 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2032-4_7

³⁶ D Tin and others, 'Clashes and Crowds: Protests, Riots, and Other Mass Gathering Events in North America 2021–2022', *Public Health*, 221 (2023), 166–69 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.puhe.2023.06.022>

³⁷ Vincent Miller and Keith J. Hayward, "'I Did My Bit': Terrorism, Tarde and the Vehicle Ramming Attack as an Imitative Event', *The British Journal of Criminology*, 59.4 (2019), 1008 <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azy031>

³⁸ Benjamin K Sovacool, Chad Baum, and Sean Low, 'The next Climate War? Statecraft, Security, and Weaponization in the Geopolitics of a Low-Carbon Future', *Energy Strategy Reviews*, 45 (2023), 101031 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2022.101031>

organizations, fought for their beliefs, and confronted the consequences of their actions.³⁹

The current trend in women's terrorism studies often portrays women as primarily victims of violence initiated by men. This paper suggests that, through cyber indoctrination, women can actively participate in a new feminist perspective of extreme doctrine, known as women *jihadists*. In this role, women can influence men by educating them and their children about the ideology while also facilitating terrorist operations.⁴⁰ Moreover, women are viewed as the guardians of familial principles and morality, making them responsible for passing down this knowledge to future generations. This revolutionary approach allows women, as sleeper cells, to conduct indoctrination within their families, marking a significant departure from previous methods.

At the operational unit level, the advancement of women's participation in terrorism is primarily driven by the most prominent current terror group, ISIS (Daesh), which established the Al-Khansa brigade. This brigade includes women from various regions across the globe and functions as a unique religious police-militia system responsible for Hisbah (law enforcement), particularly among women residents. It represents a new phase in women's involvement in terrorism. The Khansa Brigade, consisting of members from Europe and Central Asia, also serves as the enforcer of *jinayat* (punishments) for women.⁴¹

One of the most influential members of this brigade was an Indonesian woman named Ummu Sabrina, also known as Siti Khadija. She emigrated to Syria with her family from Bogor. Ummu Sabrina held the administrator role, essentially serving as the cyber indoctrination leader for the 'Kabar Dunia Islam' or KDI Facebook page, which was dedicated to cyber indoctrination. Before Facebook closed this page, it had garnered a membership of 416,718 thanks to its highly appealing indoctrination methods. This marked a new phase in ISIS's efforts to recruit members via social media in Indonesia, where cyber indoctrination proved to be a more massive and effective method for recruitment.⁴²

As a comparison, in Uzbekistan, research conducted by Kovacich, Jones, and Luzwich revealed that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, an organization

³⁹ Mark G Stewart, 'Spatial Variability of Explosive Blast Loading and Its Effect on Damage Risks to Reinforced Concrete Buildings', *Engineering Structures*, 285 (2023), 115650 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.engstruct.2023.115650>

⁴⁰ Amira Jadoon and others, 'Breaking the Glass Ceiling? Female Participation in Militant Organizations in Islamic State Affiliates in Southeast Asia', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 34.8 (2022), 1774–96 <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2020.1838904>

⁴¹ Ruth Gan and others, 'Change Is the Only Constant: The Evolving Role of Women in the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)', *Women and Criminal Justice*, 29.4–5 (2019), 204–20 <https://doi.org/10.1080/08974454.2018.1547674>

⁴² Sukawarsini Djelantik, 'Islamic State and the Social Media in Indonesia', *Journal of Content, Community and Communication*, 9 (2019), 146–55 <https://doi.org/10.31620/JCCC.06.19/20>

affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), executed campaigns to indoctrinate individuals via social media.⁴³ These social media campaigns sought to secure support, disseminate propaganda, establish connections with terrorists, engage in proxy terrorism, and garner allegiance.⁴⁴ The Government should take several actions to protect cyber indoctrination victims in Indonesia. The first step is to halt the influx of indoctrination, especially via social media. This can be achieved through collaboration with social media providers, where the providers assist the Indonesian Government in identifying and deleting accounts and materials containing potential indoctrination content.

The second step involves conducting social rehabilitation for cyber indoctrination victims. This rehabilitation helps victims reintegrate into society and provides them with enlightenment regarding pseudo-religious indoctrination. Social rehabilitation should follow a one-way ticket system, meaning that individuals who have completed the rehabilitation program cannot re-enter it. If they are caught again, they should be processed under criminal law or have their citizenship revoked. Sollev's research yielded startling results, showing that terror indoctrination through social media and the internet had a significant impact. It revealed that hundreds of women required deradicalization programs, specifically social rehabilitation programs initiated by the Government. These rehabilitation and deradicalization programs were chosen in response to the Uzbek government's consideration of the situation in Iraq, where terrorist detainees in prisons were found to indoctrinate inmates involved in general crimes.⁴⁵

The shift in paradigm and operations among women perpetrators of terrorism has ushered in a new era. In a recent edition of their Arabic-language newspaper (obtained from a leader of cyber indoctrination with Indonesian or Uzbekistan citizenship who translated it), extremist groups reminded female sympathizers within the global network of their obligation to participate in physical jihad or serve as sleeper cells. This directive was articulated in their online releases, magazines, and content. As part of the fight against the Islamic State, indoctrinators urged women in Islamic society to actively contribute to the war effort on all fronts in support of the mujahedeen (*jihadists*).⁴⁶

⁴³ Derrick Tin and others, 'Threat Awareness Training for Non-Governmental Organizations Deploying Humanitarian Aid Workers into Conflict Environments', *The American Journal of Emergency Medicine*, 66 (2023), 161–63 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajem.2023.01.018>

⁴⁴ Emma Van Santen, 'Combatting Organised Crime and Terrorism in Central Asia', *Journal of Financial Crime*, 25.2 (2017), 309–319 <https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-07-2017-0069>

⁴⁵ S Ginguéné and others, 'Terrorisme et Terroriste: De l'acte à l'individu Qui Le Commet, Différences Représentationnelles et Émotionnelles', *Psychologie Française*, 68.3 (2023), 407–26 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psfr.2023.03.001>

⁴⁶ Any Rufaeda and Idhamsyah Eka Putra, 'Coping with Stigma and Social Exclusion of Terror-Convicts' Wives in Indonesia: An Interpretative Phenomenological', *Qualitative Report*, 23.6 (2018), 1334–46 <https://doi.org/10.46743/2160-3715/2018.3118>

This call signifies a transformation in the operations of women terrorists, including those in Indonesia and Uzbekistan. It marks a significant shift in the terror activities of women, particularly in Indonesia and Uzbekistan. Indonesia has witnessed a series of devastating suicide attacks resulting in numerous casualties. The perpetrators targeted churches and police stations, with the striking aspect being that family members carried out these attacks. Law enforcement has linked all of them to the Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) local radical network, which has pledged allegiance to the "Islamic State" (IS) group. One of the female terrorists in Indonesia was Dian Yulia Novi from Bogor, who attempted a suicide bombing at the Republic of Indonesia's State Palace. Dian received a sentence of 7 years and 6 months of imprisonment for this attempt. Another female perpetrator was the wife of Nurdin Mohd Top, who concealed her husband's involvement in terrorism. She was sentenced to three years of imprisonment.

Dian was recruited and indoctrinated by Solihin, an ISIS indoctrinator, who married her with the intention of turning her into a suicide bomber in the name of religion. This marriage did not involve the bride's family, a practice that goes against Islamic Sharia. Solihin explained, "If I marry Neng Dian, and many people know about it, the *jihād* plan will be exposed." Following the marriage, Solihin assisted Dian in preparing for the bombing, as he had received this task from the Indonesian Daesh/ISIS commander, Bahrun Naim, who issued the command from Iraq.⁴⁷ As seen in Dian's case, the old method of member recruitment is not as extensive as the new method of cyber indoctrination. Dian represents a victim of the old model of indoctrination, where indoctrinators needed to educate victims one by one in secret. In contrast, current cyber indoctrination is more massive and efficient on a global scale. As of now, more than 1580 Indonesian citizens are involved with ISIS. Among them, 451 men and 188 women emigrated to Syria and Iraq as part of their *hijra* (immigration). Additionally, 107 men and four women perished in these countries while serving as ISIS fighters. Meanwhile, 555 individuals were deported back to Indonesia, and 97 managed to return just before the Indonesian Government imposed a ban on repatriation. This figure does not include those who may have covertly returned to Indonesia before the Government's prohibition on repatriation was implemented.⁴⁸

Apart from that, the authors also examined the posts and content uploaded by the indoctrinators. The old indoctrination methods emphasizing compliance to

⁴⁷ Ummu Atiyah, Ahmad Zakuan, and Seniwati, 'Combating Terrorism through Community Engagement: Experiences from Malaysia and Indonesia', in *Civil Society Organizations Against Terrorism: Case Studies from Asia*, 1st edn (London: Routledge, 2021), pp. 107–27 <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003150145-5>

⁴⁸ Shereen Abd El-Moneam Ahmed and Samia Gaballah, 'Conflict and Communication Gap among the Critical Care Nurses during Care of Patients with COVID-19', *International Journal of Africa Nursing Sciences*, 18 (2023), 100499 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijans.2022.100499>

husbands, while effective, had limitations in achieving widespread and global dissemination to establish subordinate relationships within families involved in terrorism. The new methods of cyber indoctrination proved to be more effective in recruiting a large number of followers through cyber interactions and in transforming these followers into sleeper cells, which are essentially secret terrorist spies.⁴⁹

Table 1. Indonesian citizens affiliated with conflicts in Syria and Iraq

No.	Indonesian Citizens affiliated with FTF in Syria and Iraq	Men	Women	Total
1	Still present in the countries of Syria and Iraq	451	188	639
2	Have deceased in the countries of Syria and Iraq	107	4	111
3	Have returned to the state of Indonesia	76	21	97
4	Have been deported to the state of Indonesia	315	238	555
5	Plans to depart to Syria and/or Iraq	116	62	178
	Total	1,067	513	1,580

The involvement of thousands of people is rather surprising, as Indonesia has not historically seen such a large number of citizens involved with global foreign terror groups. In the pyramid of participation, the number of actual followers engaging in acts of terror is certainly smaller than the total number of sympathizers, each with varying degrees of sympathy. This demonstrates the high level of effectiveness of cyber indoctrination by terror groups on Indonesian citizens. Similar situations have occurred in Uzbekistan and other countries, where thousands of citizens migrated and fought in support of ISIS in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.⁵⁰

The participation of over 500 women, including those who have died and those who returned to Indonesia before the repatriation ban, highlights the magnitude of their involvement. This underscores why terror groups like ISIS target women, considering them among the most vulnerable targets. Women's engagement in terrorism has emerged as a new choice, fueled by the belief that women are more susceptible to indoctrination than men. Many psychological factors motivate women to partake in terrorism, including ideological indoctrination.⁵¹ Security services may underestimate the threat posed by women, assuming they are less capable of carrying out acts of terrorism than men. However, this perception is inaccurate, as women can be just as deadly as men when launching terror

⁴⁹ Elisa Wynne-Hughes, 'Building Consent for Counterterrorism: Lonely Planet and Rough Guide Tips for Women Tourists to Revolutionary Egypt', *Annals of Tourism Research Empirical Insights*, 4.2 (2023), 100105 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annale.2023.100105>

⁵⁰ Kai A Konrad, 'The Collective Security Dilemma of Preemptive Strikes', *European Journal of Operational Research*, 2023 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2023.10.010>

⁵¹ Lucy Resnyansky and others, 'Reasons behind Reasons: A Communitarian Reading of Women's Radicalization and Family Bombings in Southeast Asia', in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Special Issue on Radicalization in the Asia-Pacific Region: Themes and Concepts*, 2022 <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2022.2034229>

operations, as exemplified by incidents involving explosive-laden vehicles driven by women.

Radical groups use women as both subjects and primary actors in acts of terrorism due to clear reasons. Indoctrination patterns compel women and indoctrinated individuals to engage in illogical and extreme actions that ordinary people would find impossible, such as self-blasting, looting, vandalizing, traveling to dangerous distant places, engaging in anarchic activities, and taking other extreme measures. Their trust and submissiveness make them more willing to take risks in various acts of terror.⁵²

In Uzbekistan, 1526 people migrated to Syria and Iraq, but unlike Indonesia, Uzbekistan chose to repatriate 531 of its citizens who joined terrorist organizations in foreign countries like Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. The repatriation of 318 women was a key concern for the Uzbekistan authorities because they were deemed victims of indoctrination.⁵³ Indonesia and Uzbekistan adopted opposing policies regarding the repatriation of terrorist perpetrators for different reasons. Uzbekistan citizens suffered massive indoctrination because of several factors. The first and utmost technological advancement led nearly every citizen to access the internet and information. The second factor is that the terror group had sophisticated cyber indoctrination methods to recruit members. The third factor was soviet enthusiasm. The fourth factor is poverty and economic reasons. The terror group promised “economic heaven” with free healthcare, huge salaries, free social services, etc., let the terror group deceive many young men and women.

According to Victoroff, as quoted by Wolfowicz et al., some women take on the role of ideologists who indoctrinate other women into terrorist groups.⁵⁴ Tutin Sugiarti, from Padasukan, Tasikmalaya, West Java, held a middle management position as a recruiter in accordance with Victoroff's typology. Sugiarti played a significant role in recruiting Dian to become a suicide bomber by promising her the reward of heaven. Both Sugiarti and Solihin were active members of the terrorist group controlled by Bahrun Naim.⁵⁵

Another example of direct female involvement in military activities within the MIT (Mujahidin Indonesia Timur/East Indonesia Mujahideen) group is Umi

⁵² Nicholas J Clark and Philip M Dixon, 'Extended Laplace Approximation for Self-Exciting Spatio-Temporal Models of Count Data', *Spatial Statistics*, 56 (2023), 100762 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spasta.2023.100762>

⁵³ Charles J. Sullivan, 'Afghanistan in Anarchy: America's Withdrawal, Taliban Rule and Regional Implications for Central Asia', *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs*, 9.3 (2022) <https://doi.org/10.1177/23477970221129908>

⁵⁴ Michael Wolfowicz and others, 'A Field-Wide Systematic Review and Meta Analysis of Putative Risk and Protective Factors for Radicalization Outcomes', *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 36.3 (2020), 407–47 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-019-09439-4>

⁵⁵ Atiyah, Zakuan, and Seniwati.

Delima, who was the second wife of Santoso, the group's first leader. Umi Delima, originally from Bima and known by her real name Jumiatun, participated in training camps in Gunung Biru and engaged in armed confrontations between MIT and security forces. During these encounters, Umi Delima was recognized for carrying an M-16 rifle. According to Haryanto,⁵⁶ Umi Delima's participation in armed battles marked the first instance of Indonesian women serving as guerrilla combatants for MIT, which is affiliated with ISIS in Indonesia.

Another role with higher involvement is that of a group leader, a position that exposes individuals to the risk of imprisonment or even a death sentence due to their recruitment efforts for terrorism.⁵⁷ A notable example of such a leader was Aisyah Lina Kamelya, whose assumed nationality was Indonesian. She held the position of leader within the Daesh (ISIS) organization and played a key role in establishing the Baqiyah United Group (BUG), a social media group dedicated to indoctrinating women in support of pro-Daesh ideology.⁵⁸ In other words, she was a woman who rose to the leadership role in the realm of cyber indoctrination.

Kamelya and Ummu Shabrina's cunning tactics have eluded authorities as they continue to play pivotal roles in online indoctrination, managing groups or pages with millions of followers. This leadership position is highly unusual in the context of terrorist groups, which typically maintain a patriarchal structure and are slow to adapt. However, these terrorist groups have undergone ideological adjustments that empower women to assume greater roles in acts of terror.⁵⁹ Women's participation in terrorism and suicide bombings challenges cultural stereotypes that depict women as virtuous, untainted, and peaceful. Their engagement in terrorism is often more perilous than that of males, as they can exploit areas of vulnerability and their attacks carry a significant level of impact.⁶⁰ Recognizing the potential for terror attacks by women to have a greater impact,

⁵⁶ Sahrasad Herdi and Al Chaidar, 'Indonesian Terrorist, ISIS, and Globalization of Terror: A Perspective', *Ahkam: Jurnal Ilmu Syariah*, 18.1 (2018), 1–22 <https://doi.org/10.15408/ajis.v18i1.7494>

⁵⁷ Michael A. Hogg and Joanne R. Smith., 'Attitudes in Social Context: A Social Identity Perspective', *European Review of Social Psychology*, 18.1 (2007), 89–131 <https://doi.org/10.1080/10463280701592070>

⁵⁸ Resnyansky and others.

⁵⁹ Nava Nuraniyah, 'Not Just Brainwashed: Understanding the Radicalization of Indonesian Female Supporters of the Islamic State', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 30.6 (2018), 890–910 <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1481269>

⁶⁰ Abraham Yosipof, Gordon Woo, and Nadejda Komendantova, 'Persistence of Risk Awareness: Manchester Arena Bombing on 22 May 2017', *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, 94 (2023), 103805 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdr.2023.103805>

terrorist groups have intensified their efforts in indoctrinating women globally particularly through cyber indoctrination.⁶¹

There is a significant increase in active involvement by women in terrorist groups in Indonesia and acts of terror committed by Indonesian women within various ISIS-affiliated wings. These groups include JAD, BUG, MIT, KDI, and independent cells (lone wolves) that pledge loyalty to Daesh (ISIS). Women's roles in terrorism have evolved from complementary to becoming primary perpetrators, with some holding leadership positions. ISIS-linked terrorist organizations use social media for indoctrination, employing cyber indoctrination as a recruitment tool. This new recruitment pattern allows women to radicalize in online chat forums and through released content, where they express their opinions and establish connections with individuals who provide indoctrination within the global network, often using encrypted messages. Consequently, countering cyber indoctrination through the pseudo-religious ideology devised by terrorists requires not only security measures but also ideological efforts. Ironically, what these individuals consider as a path to divine pleasure often leads them to harm others, potentially invoking the wrath of God.

"Pseudo-religion" or "pseudo-religism," as described by Biever and quoted by Marcos, is generally a derogatory term used to characterize non-mainstream belief systems or philosophies that exhibit characteristics akin to religious movements. These characteristics typically include having a founder, primarily written texts, worship rituals, and faith-based beliefs.⁶² Examples of belief systems labeled as pseudo-religions include Theosophy, Corporate Kabbalism, Christian Science, Takfiri ideology, and Scientology. They have all been referred to as pseudo religism.⁶³ It is important to note that "Takfiri" is a term used derogatorily to refer to the ideological core of groups like Daesh (ISIS).⁶⁴

Terrorist groups with pseudo-religism ideologies are indeed unique in their approach. Pseudo-religism terrorism is rooted in doctrines that were initially rejected or not aligned with mainstream religious teachings. For example, the concept of *jihad*, originally meant as self-defense, has been distorted into a doctrine advocating the destruction and terrorization of peaceful places. These groups view

⁶¹ Hanen Ameer and others, 'ChildProtect: A Parental Control Application for Tracking Hostile Surfing Content', *Entertainment Computing*, 44 (2023), 100517 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.entcom.2022.100517>

⁶² Moisés Pérez Marcos, 'Scientist Naturalism as Pseudo Religion and Anti-Natural Theology', *Scientia et Fides Open Access*, 10.1 (2022), 73–90 <https://doi.org/10.12775/SetF.2022.004>

⁶³ Helen A. Berger and Douglas Ezzy, 'Mass Media and Religious Identity: A Case Study of Young Witches', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 48.3 (2009), 501–14 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5906.2009.01462.x>

⁶⁴ Mohammed Badar, Masaki Nagata, and Tiphany Tueni, 'The Radical Application of the Islamist Concept of Takfir', *Arab Law Quarterly Open Access*, 31.2 (2017), 134–62 <https://doi.org/10.1163/15730255-31020044>

terrorism as a manifestation of their devotion to Allah.⁶⁵ Another aspect of their narrative revolves around the perceived injustices faced by the ummah (Islamic society). When other groups, such as OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or Papua Independence Organization), engage in acts of terror, they are not labeled as terrorists but rather referred to as armed criminals. Terrorist groups are organized entities with specific ideologies and doctrines that they indoctrinate into their followers. They carry out acts of terror driven by clear motives, goals, and unique ideologies.⁶⁶ Certain group members may be targeted at certain levels as objects within these terrorist organizations. The doctrines of these groups are carefully crafted to sound impressive and are sometimes presented as part of religious teachings, although in reality, they often provide false hope.

The doctrines of these terrorist groups closely resemble and often mimic the teachings of Islam. They cover topics such as *jihād*, *zakaat* (obligatory charity), religious sacrifice, the implementation of Sharia law, and more. These groups, characterized by pseudo-religism, frequently use similar foundations that revolve around identity claims. Their discussions often focus on issues such as the oppression of people (*ummah*), foreign or infidel conspiracies, and intense identity divisions, such as the binary choice of "being with us or with taghut" (the tyrannical Government that oppresses the *ummah*).⁶⁷

The perpetrators or sympathizers were influenced and followed the instructed doctrines. This phenomenon is often referred to as pseudo-religism, which is an alternative term for pseudo-religion. The prefix "pseudo-" signifies a striking resemblance that can be deceptive, as it takes on a false yet similar form. The term "religion" denotes authentic similarities based on identity, making it one of the most extreme examples of pseudo-religion in our contemporary society. Individuals who adopt a more earnest approach within such pseudo-religism groups may perceive themselves as adherents of a legitimate religion. However, genuine believers often regard them as outsiders or members of a pseudo-religious sect.⁶⁸

In the context of pseudo-religism, the term 'pseudo' conveys an intentional but misleading resemblance. Pseudo-religism serves as an alternative designation for

⁶⁵ Marcos.

⁶⁶ Jaka Susila, 'Globalization of Terrorism and Extra-Judicial Killings: The Paradox of Human Rights in Indonesia', *The Indonesian Journal of Legal Thought*, 1.1 (2021), 43–55 <https://doi.org/10.23917/ijleth.v1i1.12784>

⁶⁷ Ibrahim D Raheem and Sara le Roux, 'Geopolitical Risks and Tourism Stocks: New Evidence from Causality-in-Quantile Approach', *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance*, 88 (2023), 1–7 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2023.01.002>

⁶⁸ K N M Agojo and others, 'Activism beyond the Streets: Examining Social Media Usage and Youth Activism in the Philippines', *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 2023 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajss.2023.04.006>

pseudo-religion, where the prefix 'pseudo' signifies a striking yet deceptive similarity, representing a notably false form but bearing resemblance. The term 'religion' denotes genuine similarities rooted in identity, making it one of contemporary society's most extreme examples of pseudo-religion. Another manifestation of pseudo-religism often originates from schisms or separations from established beliefs, typically centered on apocalyptic doctrines and writings that fail to gain approval within recognized religious institutions.⁶⁹ The doctrine espoused by these terrorist groups bears an exceptionally strong resemblance to genuine religious teachings. The amalgamation of various pseudo-religious doctrines with political identity assertions proves effective in enticing individuals, particularly those with limited knowledge, to become involved or take initiative in acts of terrorism.⁷⁰

The aforementioned ideology and doctrines have served as the foundation for acts of terrorism. Both men and women engage in suicide bombings and violent activities inspired by what can be characterized as pseudo-religism or a specific ideology. Those who perpetrate or sympathize with these acts are profoundly influenced and obediently follow the prescribed doctrines.⁷¹ Pseudo-religism terrorists perceive the world as currently under the dominion of a dark conspiracy, a hostile force opposed to the Almighty, which fuels their commitment to serving Allah (God). Typically, these terrorists exhibit unwavering and extreme faith, deeply ingrained through indoctrination. They view terrorism as a manifestation of their devotion to Allah or God.⁷² Pseudo-religism terrorism has partly evolved from ideologies that extend beyond traditional religious teachings, such as the concept of jihad as a means of self-defense. These ideologies have been distorted into doctrines for the purpose of instilling fear and terror in people.

The Indonesian Government and Uzbekistan's authorities have implemented countermeasures to mitigate the risk of extensive cyber indoctrination. They have partnered with various service providers, including Telegram, WhatsApp, Facebook, and internet service providers, to identify and remove detected or potential instances of cyber indoctrination and apprehend the perpetrators. This collaborative effort marks the initial phase in the broader strategy to combat widespread cyber indoctrination orchestrated by terrorist groups. These countermeasures aimed at preventing extensive cyber indoctrination have proven to be effective. Cyber indoctrination can no longer proliferate on the same scale as

⁶⁹ Berger and Ezzy.

⁷⁰ Jianming Ding, Tianlong Zhang, and Hua Li, 'Recent Advances in Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy for Explosive Analysis', *TrAC Trends in Analytical Chemistry*, 166 (2023), 117197 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trac.2023.117197>

⁷¹ James H. Liu and Mark Woodward, 'Towards an Indigenous Psychology of Religious Terrorism with Global Implications: Introduction to AJSP's Special Issue on Islamist Terrorism in Indonesia', *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 16.2 (2013), 79–82 <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajsp.12025>

⁷² Spencer.

before; accounts, websites, and materials associated with cyber indoctrination operate within restricted circles, significantly diminishing their effectiveness in disseminating extremist ideologies.

Additionally, the Government has enacted stringent anti-terrorism legislation to address perpetrators. This legislation, Indonesian Law No. 5 of 2018 on Anti-Terrorism, provides specific and rigorous measures beyond ordinary law. According to this law, various legal sanctions can be imposed on individuals involved in acts of terrorism. These sanctions include imprisonment for a minimum of five years and a maximum of twenty years, life imprisonment, and even the death penalty. For those involved in indoctrination, Article 12, Clause 2 of the law threatens imprisonment for a minimum of two years and a maximum of twenty years. Under Clause 3, indoctrinators who use electronic documents can face a minimum of three years in prison and a maximum of twenty years. Furthermore, Indonesia's Anti-Terrorism Law recognizes deradicalization as a crucial element of prevention. In 2000, Uzbekistan enacted the Law on Combating Terrorism, known as UU Combating Terrorism. This legislation outlines that sanctions for acts of terrorism are determined in accordance with the country's criminal code.

However, it does not provide specific sentencing guidelines for terrorism-related offenses. This contrasts with Indonesia's Anti-Terrorism Law, which explicitly prescribes distinct sanctions separate from those outlined in the Criminal Code. In Uzbekistan, individuals who have engaged in acts of terrorism, including those who have returned from conflict zones such as Syria, have received sentences of approximately 15 years in prison. Others, who were deported from Turkish correctional facilities, received sentences of ten years. Additionally, there are still pending trials for certain individuals awaiting verdicts. Article 24 of the Law on Combating Terrorism outlines provisions regarding social rehabilitation. According to Article 24 of the Law on Combating Terrorism, the Prosecutor General's Office has the authority to impose sanctions in the form of a rehabilitation process for Uzbek citizens who were 'misled' into joining terrorist groups in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, provided that they were not directly involved in combat or terrorist activities. This policy is rooted in the recognition that, as *manus ministra*, these women are victims whose human rights must be safeguarded.

Legal Protection for Women's Human Rights as Manus Manistra in their Involvement as Indoctrination Victims: The Case of Indonesia and Uzbekistan

Women's involvement in terrorism often occurs as a result of exposure to indoctrination conducted by terrorist groups. These groups successfully persuade women to leave their families and join their ranks, engaging in activities such as suicide bombings, combat roles, guerrilla warfare, providing shelter to terrorists,

and more. The crux of the pseudo-religious doctrine lies in the battle of minds waged by terrorist groups to indoctrinate women.⁷³ In this context, it is essential to acknowledge that women's involvement in terrorism cases cannot be solely attributed to their volition. Rather, it does not preclude the possibility of categorizing them as *manus ministra*, or victims. As victims, they possess inherent human rights that must be safeguarded, as per the legal protection theory.

The pseudo-religism doctrine represents a pivotal tool employed by terrorist groups in their efforts to indoctrinate women. An illustrative example of such indoctrination can be found in an online publication disseminated by Daesh for the recruitment of women. Daesh endeavors to indoctrinate women by invoking the concepts of *hijra* (travel/migration) and *jihad*. It is important to note that both *hijra* and *jihad* are indeed instructed by Allah, as articulated in religious texts. However, the Daesh terrorist group manipulates these concepts, infusing them with pseudo-religious elements to formulate interpretations and citations that lead many women to a determined pursuit of *hijra* to Daesh-controlled regions or 'jihad' according to Daesh's directives. These actions do not necessarily align with the authentic interpretation of the Qur'anic verse.⁷⁴

Actually, their indoctrination can be denied if they know the true Islamic teaching. "He who constructed the idea of Sharia does not distinguish women and men regarding *hijra*, yet he obliged upon both, despite the difficulties, trials, and peril alongside the process. Those who revise the *sirah* of the Prophet may see it on their own. There is no single Sharia text which prohibits a woman without a *mahram* (a guardian from the family) to go *hijra* or even with the risk of being captured, murdered, or tortured". Another example of pseudo-religism doctrine is an indoctrination conducted by Solihin towards Dian to the point where Dian was convinced to commit a suicide bombing. Solihin also indoctrinated Dian regarding the validity of his marriage with Dian, which was carried out with no guardian or witnesses. According to Ibn Majah, marriage without a guardian and witnesses is prohibited by Islamic Sharia.⁷⁵

Seeing how similar yet ambiguous the doctrines (especially cyber indoctrination) are from Daesh, Muslim women should again refer to the solid propositions that are more valid than the narrative doctrine from the terror groups. According to Islamic law, even when traveling for a pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, a woman must obtain her husband's permission and be in the

⁷³ Enryka Christopher Mary Bunn and others, 'Supporting Women and Children Returning from Violent Extremist Contexts: Proposing a 5R Framework to Inform Program and Policy Development', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 2023 <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2023.2169142>

⁷⁴ Bader Al-Ibrahim, 'ISIS, Wahhabism and Takfir', *Contemporary Arab Affair Journal*, 8.3 (2015), 66–79 <https://doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2015.1051376>

⁷⁵ M. Achour and others, 'Management and Supervisory Support as a Moderator of Work–Family Demands and Women's Well-Being: A Case Study of Muslim Female Academicians in Malaysia', *Humanomics*, 33.3 (2017), 335–56 <https://doi.org/10.1108/H-02-2017-0024>

company of her guardian to guarantee her safety, let alone go for *hijra* and *jihad*. Moreover, the wisdom behind this permission is the safety of the women who travel, and it is not to oppress them.⁷⁶ Women who encounter online doctrines from terrorist groups without a sufficient understanding are susceptible to influence, often becoming willing to engage in terrorist actions without further consideration.

The aforementioned Sharia provisions are established to safeguard them against various forms of danger, including threats to their dignity.⁷⁷ This misuse of information significantly heightens the risk of indoctrination among women, motivating them to join terrorist groups on religious grounds. The Uzbek authorities have embraced this perspective in their approach to women and children who have joined terrorist groups and later migrated to areas controlled by these groups. The Uzbek authorities regard such women as victims, recognizing that the terrorist groups may have deceived them through extensive cyber indoctrination efforts. It becomes challenging to discern whether these teachings are accurate when individuals are subjected to such deceptive tactics.

Another perilous doctrine is the *takfir* doctrine, which recklessly labels believers as *kafir* (disbelievers) without proper justification. In the realm of Islamic jurisprudence, such instances of *takfir* carry significant consequences, impacting matters such as inheritance, marriage, the permissibility of killing, and more. This doctrine serves as a shield for terrorist groups, providing a purported legal basis for their actions, including acts such as killing, confiscation of property, and defacement, which they justify by categorizing individuals who leave the faith as disbelievers (*kafir murtad*). This doctrine can extend to labeling the Government and all its institutions as disbelievers, thereby creating a pretext for armed terrorism.

They seek validation for their claims from the opinions of scholars, contending that 'Every person who legislates apart from Allah's laws is a *thaghut* (false deity).' Building on this premise, they assert that state governments are *thaghut* regimes and their officials are disbelievers, as are all who support these governments.⁷⁸ Consequently, anyone involved in enacting positive laws or making decisions based on such laws is branded a disbeliever, a grave one, and is considered to have renounced their Islamic faith, irrespective of their observance of the five

⁷⁶ Piotr Bachtin, 'Women's Writing in Action: On Female-Authored Hajj Narratives in Qajar Iran', *Iranian Studies*, 54.1–2 (2021), 67–93 <https://doi.org/10.1080/00210862.2020.1724506>

⁷⁷ Willy Willy, Billy Samuel Karwur, and Yoas Wicaksana Karouw, 'Phenomenes of Violence on the Name of Religion Towards Terrorism Acts', *International Journal of Social, Policy and Law*, 2.3 (2021), 92–101 <https://doi.org/10.8888/ijospl.v2i3.50>

⁷⁸ Herdi Sahrasadi and others, 'Indonesian Terrorism: Wahabism and the "Imagined Caliphate"', *Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies*, 45.1–2 (2020), 31–45. https://www.jspes.org/spring_summer_2020_sahrasad.html

pillars of Islam and engagement in other virtuous deeds.⁷⁹ These notions have the potential to proliferate rapidly through cyber indoctrination, a method far more perilous than conventional means, given its capacity to reach and influence a large audience.

In comparing the policies of the Indonesian Government and the Uzbekistan Authority, it becomes evident that in Uzbekistan, perpetrators of terrorism may commit acts of terror under the misguided belief that they are fighting for their religion, unaware that they are being manipulated. Women and children who become entangled in terrorism due to exposure to such indoctrination are regarded as *manus ministra*, indicating that they are not subjected to imprisonment. Instead, they are directed toward education, counseling, and rehabilitation and provided with social support as part of their rehabilitation process.⁸⁰

This is the underlying rationale for the Uzbek authorities' decision to repatriate their citizens who had migrated to areas controlled by terrorists, particularly women and children. Individuals who were not known to have engaged in acts of terrorism are welcomed back with open arms. They are then required to participate in a social rehabilitation program administered by the Uzbek authorities for a specified duration. This choice is guided by the principle of humanity and underscores the Uzbek government's commitment to addressing the needs of its citizens. There is a great chance that these women and children have the status of *manus ministra*, who certainly have the right to protect their human rights.

Conversely, Indonesia opposes the repatriation of Indonesian citizens who have been indoctrinated and subsequently decided to migrate to foreign territories under the control of terrorist groups. Indonesia prioritizes the interests of its unindoctrinated citizens. The return of sympathizers from Iraq and Syria poses inherent risks, as their presence could potentially influence the general population to embrace terrorist ideologies through indoctrination.⁸¹

Indonesia has also decided to impose legal sanctions on every captured terror perpetrator, even if they have not yet committed any acts of terror. This policy starkly contrasts the approach taken by the Uzbek authorities. The Indonesian Government justifies this stance by considering such actions as criminal offenses that merit punishment. Concurrently, Indonesia has established a deradicalization program to assist perpetrators seeking to reform while serving their sentences.

⁷⁹ Susan Sim, 'Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Indonesia', in *The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies*, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2017), pp. 255–67 <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315455655-21>

⁸⁰ Wawan Edi Prastiyo and I Ketut Rai Setiabudhi, 'Children Involvement in Terrorism Activities: Perpetrator or Victim? (A Study on the Circle of Violence)', *Padjadjaran Jurnal Ilmu Hukum Open Access*, 8.2 (2021), 213–31 <https://doi.org/22304/pjih.v8n2.a3>

⁸¹ Widagdo, Indrayanti, and Saraswati.

This criminal sanction aims to create a deterrent effect for other prospecting terrorists. The Indonesian Government wants to protect the human rights of citizens who risk becoming victims of terror. Terrorist organizations that employ indoctrination techniques on women, persuading them to commit terror acts, are guilty of crimes against conscience. As Gigaur suggests,⁸² It cannot be argued that the crime of terrorism can be categorized as *malum in se* rather than *malum prohibitum*, as it is a crime that strikes at the very core of one's moral conscience.⁸³

The treatment of women who are involved in terrorism can be achieved through deradicalization programs. These programs aim to eliminate the influence of indoctrination from terrorist organizations, helping women understand the situation and sever the impact of radicalization. The primary objective is to prevent this influence from affecting the women's children and families. This approach is often referred to as a 'soft approach,' which involves the participation of former terrorists, anti-terrorism action campaigns, and a judicious and transparent approach to counterterrorism efforts.⁸⁴

The deradicalization efforts in Indonesia are conducted by the Government as part of their high-security measures. The deradicalization process in Indonesia typically involves religious non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, among others. This approach is aimed at ensuring that the materials used in the deradicalization process are in accordance with religious principles and to prevent any public perception that deradicalization efforts are opposed to religion.⁸⁵ In Uzbekistan, a government-supervised social rehabilitation program is designed to assist victims of cyber indoctrination in reintegrating into society. This process involves representatives from the community working together to support the victims and ensure their acceptance by society. The social rehabilitation program also collaborates with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), particularly those specializing in religious relationships. These NGOs often employ experts, including Islamic scholars, to provide explanations of religious teachings and professionals to offer vocational training and employment opportunities.⁸⁶

Terrorist groups often employ a narrative reminiscent of the beliefs held by the Khawarij groups from the past. They use arguments rooted in the Holy Qur'an,

⁸² Tinatin Gigauri, 'Why and How Women Join ISIS', in *Global Perspectives on the Psychology of Terrorism*. (New York: IGI Global Publishers, 2022) <https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-6684-5311-7.ch014>

⁸³ Shinta Ayu Purnamawati and Sidik Sunaryo, 'Legal Politics of Pancasila Ideology against Radicalism in the State of Law Enforcement', *Jurnal Jurisprudence*, 11.2 (2021), 141–14 <https://doi.org/10.23917/jurisprudence.v11i2.14742>

⁸⁴ Ilyas Mohammed, 'De-Radicalisation and Humanitarianism in Indonesia', *Social Sciences*, 10.3 (2021), 1–17 <https://doi.org/Scopus Link> <https://www.sco>

⁸⁵ Atiyah, Zakuan, and Seniwati.

⁸⁶ Mariya Y. Omelicheva, 'The Ethnic Dimension of Religious Extremism and Terrorism in Central Asia', *International Political Science*, 31.2 (2010), 167–86 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512110364738>

particularly the principle of 'la hukma illa Allah' (there is no ruling apart from the rulings of Allah), elaborating on this with verses such as Al-Quran Chapter Al-Ma'idah (Qur'an 5:44). By contending that they do not adhere to the orders of Allah, these groups brand caliphs as disbelievers, similar to what transpired with figures like Ali, Mu'awiyah, and 'Amr bin 'Ash.⁸⁷ The accusation of disbelief extended even to Ali Ibn Abi Thalib, the fourth caliph of Islam and Prophet Muhammad's son-in-law. This underscores the vulnerability of ordinary individuals to similar accusations.⁸⁸

This is how terrorist groups employ cyber indoctrination, a process that explains the involvement of women and common individuals in acts of terrorism. Terrorism is distinct from other crimes in that the perpetrators do not harbor feelings of guilt regarding their actions. On the contrary, they feel justified by the pseudo-religism doctrine, firmly convinced that they are acting for the greater good and upholding the truth. Deradicalization efforts and the protection provided by the state play a pivotal role in eliminating the participation of women, viewed as *manus ministra*, in acts of terrorism.⁸⁹

In Indonesia, there have been several high-profile cases of women joining terror groups, with motivations varying between deception and fanaticism. Among them are individuals like Ummi Delima and Paridah, both of whom were married to terrorism perpetrators. Delima actively participated in direct battles, while Paridah assisted her husband by providing shelter. Other high-profile cases include individuals like Kamelya and Sabrina, who are known as female indoctrinators. They are responsible for conducting extensive cyber indoctrination campaigns via social media platforms and have gained recognition from the leadership of terror groups.⁹⁰

Dwi Dahlia Susanti, another Indonesian woman, was pursued by the United States due to her sophisticated involvement in financing terror groups. Similarly, Dini Rahmadhani was sought after by the Turkish Government for her role in smuggling hundreds of fighters for terror groups. These high-profile women have left a stain on their country and society, causing significant harm. Given their high-profile positions and substantial roles, if apprehended, they should be

⁸⁷ Tim Lindsey, Jamhari Makruf, and Helen Pausacker, *Islam, Education and Radicalism in Indonesia: Instructing Piety*, 1st edn (London: Routledge, 2023) <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003269229>

⁸⁸ Bo Bernhard Nielsen, Heidi Wechtler, and Linglin (Gloria) Zheng, 'Disasters and International Business: Insights and Recommendations from a Systematic Review', *Journal of World Business*, 58.4 (2023), 101458 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jwb.2023.101458>

⁸⁹ Cyril O Ugwuoke and others, 'Violent Crimes and Insecurity on Nigerian Highways: A Tale of Travelers' Trauma, Nightmares and State Slumber', *Heliyon*, 9.10 (2023), e20489 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e20489>

⁹⁰ Katherine E Brown, 'Gender, Governance, and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in the UK', *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice*, 72 (2023), 100371 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlcrj.2019.100371>

subjected to criminal law proceedings and in cases where they are located in foreign countries, consideration should be given to revoking their citizenship.⁹¹

Some women who become perpetrators of terrorism can, to a certain extent, be considered victims of the recruitment process, particularly the pattern involving cyber indoctrination. They often fall prey to brainwashing techniques and become victims of the terror organizations' indoctrination strategies.⁹² These women are sometimes manipulated by indoctrinators who employ deceit, make false promises, or exploit them through fraudulent marriages. However, in the end, they gain nothing from these acts of terror. The experience from Uzbekistan underscores the importance of realization, counter-indoctrination efforts, and legal protection as key components in thwarting terrorists' recruitment and indoctrination endeavors, preventing women from engaging in acts of terrorism.⁹³

These women often remain oblivious to the consequences of their terror targets, the extensive impacts of terrorism, and the ensuing chaos as the pseudo-doctrines propagated by terrorist organizations blind them.⁹⁴ When dealing with women who have become perpetrators of terror, immediate imprisonment should not be the primary course of action. Instead, there must be a stage of deradicalization aimed at providing them with a comprehensive understanding of their actions. Furthermore, they should be eligible for leniency in sentencing if it can be established that they were under the influence of terrorist group indoctrination, a common outcome of cyber indoctrination.⁹⁵

Following the Law on Combating Terrorism, the Uzbek authorities enforce stringent sanctions against individuals who engage in terrorist activities, utilizing legal mechanisms. Conversely, they are open to repatriating their citizens who have migrated to countries under the control of terror groups. Provided these individuals have not been involved in acts of terror or combat, they are not subject

⁹¹ Martin Gassebner, Paul Schaudt, and Melvin H L Wong, 'Armed Groups: Competition and Political Violence', *Journal of Development Economics*, 162 (2023), 103052 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2023.103052>

⁹² Suhyun Lee and Yujeong Kim, 'Predictors of Bioterrorism Preparedness among Clinical Nurses: A Cross-Sectional Study', *Nurse Education Today*, 122 (2023), 105727 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nedt.2023.105727>

⁹³ Khalid Khan, Adnan Khurshid, and Javier Cifuentes-Faura, 'Energy Security Analysis in a Geopolitically Volatile World: A Causal Study', *Resources Policy*, 83 (2023), 103673 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2023.103673>

⁹⁴ Abhishek Thommandru and Dr Benarji Chakka, 'Recalibrating the Banking Sector with Blockchain Technology for Effective Anti-Money Laundering Compliances by Banks', *Sustainable Futures*, 5 (2023), 100107 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sftr.2023.100107>

⁹⁵ A M Mooij, 'Reconciling Transparency and Privacy through the European Digital Identity', *Computer Law & Security Review*, 48 (2023), 105796 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2023.105796>

to criminal sanctions. However, they are required to undergo social rehabilitation as mandated by the Law on Combating Terrorism within Uzbekistan.⁹⁶

The current status of cyber indoctrination victims in Uzbekistan has seen significant improvement. The Uzbekistan authorities made the decision to repatriate 318 women from Syria and Iraq, without revoking their citizenship. This act of repatriation was undertaken with great consideration, as the Uzbekistan government recognized these women as victims of indoctrination.⁹⁷ While some of these women may face charges under criminal law, mainly if they are categorized as fighters or indoctrinators, the majority are viewed as victims. They cannot reintegrate into society directly and must undergo a process of social rehabilitation. Furthermore, it has been made clear that if any of them are caught engaging in such activities again, they will be subject to criminal prosecution, and the authorities may revoke their citizenship.⁹⁸

However, it is important to note that the verdict outlined in the Law on Combating Terrorism should not be applied to women who hold leadership positions within terror organizations or those who serve as indoctrinators. Women who actively engage in indoctrinating others, convincing them to participate in acts of terrorism, or assuming leadership roles within terror groups should be subject to criminal charges. Essentially, women caught up in acts of terrorism should be regarded as victims, *manus ministra*, rather than perpetrators. They should also be provided with ideological enlightenment to help them understand the wrongful and sinful nature of terrorist acts.⁹⁹

The initiatives and policies implemented by the Uzbekistan authorities are notably more humane and focused on human rights protection than those of Indonesia. These initiatives aim to ensure that victims of cyber indoctrination are able to retain their human rights while true perpetrators face prosecution under criminal law. The key requirement is the careful separation and differentiation between individuals who migrated to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, particularly between cyber indoctrination victims and genuine terrorists. It is essential to avoid subjecting cyber indoctrination victims to the same punitive measures as true

⁹⁶ Lu Li and others, 'Application of Fluorescence Sensing Technology in Trace Detection of Explosives', *Dyes and Pigments*, 220 (2023), 111651 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dyepig.2023.111651>

⁹⁷ Sullivan.

⁹⁸ Presley McGarry and Neil Shortland, 'Anxious Activism: The Role of Behavioral Inhibition System in the Radicalization Process', *Computers in Human Behavior*, 139 (2023), 107550 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2022.107550>

⁹⁹ Michael King and Donald M. Taylor, 'The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists: A Review of Theoretical Models and Social Psychological Evidence', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 23.4 (2011), 602–622 <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2011.587064> Yuliya Shapoval and Madina Bekmaganbetova, 'Hijra to "Islamic State" through the Female Narratives: The Case of Kazakhstan', *State, Religion and Church in Russia and Worldwide*, 3 (2021), 289–315 <https://doi.org/10.22394/2073-7203-2021-39-3-289-315>

terrorists, such as revoking citizenship. Victims of cyber indoctrination have endured traumatic experiences when they ventured into war-torn countries.¹⁰⁰

4. Conclusion

Pseudo-religism cyber indoctrination, in particular, has proven to be highly influential in radicalizing women and driving them toward terrorism. The term 'pseudo' indicates a deceptive similarity, signifying that it appears similar but is misleading. Such ideologies often claim to be based on religious identity but deviate from the true teachings of religion. For this reason, the Uzbek authorities have adopted a policy of repatriating their citizens who migrated to foreign countries, especially women and children. The Uzbek government has established social rehabilitation programs for these individuals, recognizing them as *manus ministra* whose human rights must be protected. The Uzbek government also imposes sanctions on perpetrators who have carried out or prepared acts of terrorism, in accordance with the Law on Combating Terrorism. Meanwhile, *manus ministra* are enrolled in social rehabilitation programs as they are seen as victims. These measures have contributed to a decrease in terrorism threats. In contrast, the Indonesian Government has adopted a different approach, rejecting the return of citizens who have moved to territories controlled by terrorist organizations to protect unindoctrinated citizens. Under the Law on Anti-Terrorism, Indonesia imposes legal sanctions without exceptions. Deradicalization efforts are carried out while inmates serve their prison sentences. However, Indonesia should consider providing legal protection for women with the *manus ministra* status as part of its efforts to deradicalize women initiated by the Terrorism Eradication National Agency. This process should involve input from psychiatrists, psychologists, and scholars who specialize in women indoctrinated by terrorists but have not engaged in terrorist actions. In the Uzbekistan experience, the kind and considerate laws and policies have also proven effective and efficient in combating terrorism and protecting the human rights of cyber indoctrination victims.

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